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Throughout the world, the future of public service broadcasting is in doubt. Partly this is a crisis of technology
and its challenges to the prior order. Partly this is a crisis of definition and role. And partly, this is a crisis of
economic organization: the capacity of a sector, because of its culture or its tradition of management, to
respond to the needs and opportunities of the moment. There is widely available literature on the relationship
between responsiveness and the structure of for-profit corporations, but precious little on the application of
governance arguments to the public and non-profit foundation sector. The argument of this Essay, however, is
that for public broadcasting to flourish, for new technologies to provide opportunities for substantial growth
in impact, it may be necessary to transform public broadcasters. Institutions and entities of the industry have
to change in ways that do not seem likely to occur without substantial outside impetus. Indeed, the entire
structure of public broadcasting, its history and relationship to government, renders it relatively impervious to
change. In antitrust policy, laws or decisions are often criticized because they protect competitors not
competition. Something similar is being argued here: the machinery and system in place, as we know it, is
designed to protect the existing players rather than the function that is to be performed in American society.
This Essay seeks to explain this and to recommend a dramatic way to alter the nature of the debate over public
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PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND THE CRISIS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MONROE E. PRICE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the world, the future of public service broadcast-
ing is in doubt. Partly this is a crisis of technology and its chal-
lenges to the prior order. Partly this is a crisis of definition and
role. And partly, this is a crisis of economic organization: the ca-
pacity of a sector, because of its culture or its tradition of manage-
ment, to respond to the needs and opportunities of the moment. l
There is widely available literature on the relationship between re-
sponsiveness and the structure of for-profit corporations,2 but pre-
cious little on the application of governance arguments to the
public and non-profit foundation sector.3 The argument of this
Essay, however, is that for public broadcasting to flourish, for new
technologies to provide opportunities for substantial growth in im-
pact, it may be necessary to transform public broadcasters. Institu-
tions and entities of the industry have to change in ways that do not
seem likely to occur without substantial outside impetus. Indeed,
the entire structure of public broadcasting, its history and relation-
ship to government, renders it relatively impervious to change. In
antitrust policy, laws or decisions are often criticized because they
protect competitors not competition. Something similar is being
argued here: the machinery and system in place, as we know it, is
designed to protect the existing players rather than the function
that is to be performed in American society. This Essay seeks to
* Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School, Spring 1999; Communications Fellow, the
Markle Foundation; Danciger Professor of Law & Director, Howard M. Squadron Program
of Law, Media and Society, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University;
Founder & Co-Director, Oxford Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, Wolf-
son College, Oxford University. His book, Television, The Public Sphere, and National Identity,
was published by Oxford University Press.
1 See RICHARD COLUNGS, FROM SATELLITE TO SINGLE MARKET: NEW COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION (1999).
2 See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corparate Governance, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 1263 (1992); Albert Caruana et. aI., The Effect of Centralization and Formalization on
Entrepreneurship in Export Firms, 36J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 16 (1998); SusanJ. Fox-Wolfgram,
et. aI., Organizational Adaptation to Institutional Change: A Comparative Study of First Order
Change in Prospectar and Defender Banks, 43 ADMIN SCI. Q. 87 (1998).
3 See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Para-
doxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998); Robert Atkinson, Unsettled
Standing: Who (Else) Should Enjarce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries, 23 J. CORP. L. 655
(1998).
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explain this and to recommend a dramatic way to alter the nature
of the debate over public broadcasting's future.
II. THE PROBLEM AND AsPIRATION
For much of the history of public television in the United
States, the aspiration, indeed, the longing, for many has been for
an entity that would look more like its European counterparts, es-
pecially the British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC"). The hope
was for public television to become more of a force in society, to
have a larger audience, and to be capable of making a greater dif-
ference in terms of the specific goals that it has always articulated
for itself. Instead, the reality of American public television has
been turbulent and beset by structural problems, instability and in-
sufficient funding. Its birthright, in fact, was a second-class tech-
nology. Now, however, technology has appeared as a possible lever
for the accomplishment of submerged and all-but-forgotten
goals.4For the reasons discussed in this Essay it is doubtful whether
any of these opportunities for leverage will be used effectively to
force those changes necessary to make public broadcasting more
capable of using new technologies. Public broadcasters, like their
commercial counterparts, want to preserve their present competi-
tive position in the name of substantial change. They want to pre-
serve most elements of the current structure but gain secure
funding and more spectrum. It is like taking an old bungalow and
pouring millions of dollars into it so that there is a more perma-
nent, fixed, and high-tech dwelling. The alternatives facing deci-
sion-makers are to maintain the current mode of public
broadcasting (with little or no change) or to create, or allow to be
created, greater conditions for internal readjustment. A third al-
ternative, actively ending public broadcasting, has had some adher-
ents, but is not considered an option here.s
4 See generally ROSELLE KOVITZ & JOHN WITHERSPOON, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC BROAD-
CASTING (1987); JAMES DAY, THE VANISHING VISIONS: THE INSIDE STORY OF PUBLIC TELEVI-
SION (1998); MICHAEL TRACEY, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING
(1998).
5 For some of the work identified with one of the harshest critics of the institutions of
public broadcasting, see LAURENCE JARVlK, PBS: BEHIND THE SCREEN (1998); Laurence
Jarvik, Making Public Television Public, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 18, 1992, at 1.
Jarvik is both a critic, however, and an identifier of PBS strengths. He recognizes that PBS,
though "warped by a series of tawdry political struggles," accomplishes three things which
are "beyond the grasp of commercial television as we know it today." These are better
children's programming, an articulate, balanced one hour news broadcasts, and occasional
programming that is "of such scope, ambition, and achievement it probably could not find
a home anywhere else on the screen."
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A. Alternatives',
Maintaining the current mode is, with its modest changes, the
most likely outcome even in the face of new technology. In this
category of the status quo belong the continuing debates over
broadening or narrowing public broadcasting's ambit, activation of
proposals to increase advertising, continued siphoning' of major
productions to new satellite-delivered channels, continued fights
over federal funding, and the prospects for an endowment or guar-
anteed funding. Changes at the margin, by definition, mean pre-
serving the existing institutions of public broadcasting, but they
slowly diminish its extended potential for contribution to the
American public sphere.
The second alternative is creating or encouraging greater con-
ditions for internal readjustment. Technology is already forcing
this to some extent,6 but more is required for the rapid overhaul-
ing of institutional arrangements to assure that agreed-upon (if
that is possible) public broadcasting can be achieved. In large
part, this means providing the legal and financial· openness that
would allow bidding and reward for further development of the
assets of public broadcasting. Even here there is a problem be-
cause it is hard, given the structure of public broadcasting, to ap-
propriately assess and value those assets. But cumulatively, they
include the existing terrestrial distribution system including, in
some markets, duplicative terrestrial distribution, existing contracts
for satellite distribution, and potential spectrum rights. They cer-
tainly include some value for branding and some, though surpris-
ingly little, in terms of library rights. The premise is that these
assets are incapable of being reoriented, tapped for much of their
value (even as non-profit assets) because the kind of change neces-
sary to maximize or even strengthen their value in light of new
technologies cannot take place without m~or structural
modification.7
B. Leverage
For the very reason of the architecture of public broadcasting
itself, there is insufficient incentive for radical, internally driven
6 See Federal Communications Commission's Fourth Notice of Proposed Rule Making
and Third Notice of Inquiry on Advanced Television Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,130, 42,131
(1995) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
7 The. idea of modest reorientation with the selling off of some .frequencies lies at the
heart of the TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC TELEVISION, QUALTIY TIME?:
THE REpORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK ON PUBLIC TELEVISION (1993) [herein-
after TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE].
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change. That is the definition of the problem. The question,
then, is what source for leverage exists. One lever for change is
the often-expressed, though probably only lukewarmly felt, desire
of Congress to get out of the business of annual funding, and per-
haps get out of the business of funding public broadcasting at all. 8
Further, there has been the leverage, of the extraordinary need of
public broadcasting for capital for transition to digital, of almost
$800 million in federal funds and $1.7 billion overall.9 There is the
leverage at the FCC and in Congress finally, to determine the rules
that will govern access to and use of digital spectrum. In addition,
issues such as the way in which direct satellite broadcasters can sat-
isfy the legislative requirement-that they set aside a portion of
their channel offerings for informational and noncommercial pro-
gramming-can be used as leverage for change. Io Without the
careful marshaling of this leverage and more, the mere existence
of new technology will not lead to the kinds of changes necessary
to substantially increase the role of public television in the United
States. It would be a separate study to demonstrate that, in broad-
casting (and other industries), modes of adaptation to technology
are a function, in large part, of industry structure. 1 1 Aside from the
initial flash of genius and the intuition of the founder, technologi-
cal progress, so the hypothesis goes, is related to the risk-taking,
decision-making capacity of a company.I2 The capacity to take ad-
vantage of opportunities, to deploy capital, to innovate, all these
are related to structure. I3 A more modest hypothesis-and per-
haps a sufficient one in the case of public broadcasting-is that
certain forms of organization and internal decision-making are
costly barriers to innovation. An organization that is conflicted be-
tween innovation and the protection of entities that are justifiable
8 SeeJARVlK, supra, note 5. In fact, since the heyday of Newt Gingrich's Contract with
America, this alternative has not been so frequently mentioned. Now the issue-and this is
present in proposals by Representative Billy Tauzin-is for a more regular and less political
pattern of funding. For the history of the politicization of funding, see DAVID M. STONE,
NIXON AND THE POLITICS OF PUBUC BROADCASTING (1985).
9 See Paige Albiniak, PBS Switch to DTV May Get Pushed Back, 128 BROADCASTING &
CABLE 6 (1998).
10 For one of the recent orders of the FCC in this proceeding, see "In the Matter of
Implementation of Section 25 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992; Direct Broadcast Satellite Public Interest Obligations," Report and Order,
MM Docket 93-25, November 19, 1998; Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d
957 (D.C. Cir. 1996); FCC Rulemaking on DBS Noncommercial Set-Aside Delayed Again, PUB.
BROADCASTING REp., Jan. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8608662.
11 See Prescott C. Ensign, Interdependence, Coordination, and Structure in Complex Organiza-
tions: Implications for Organization Design, 34 MID-ATLANTIC J. Bus. 5 (1998).
12 See generally IcHAK AnIZES, CORPORATE LIFESTI'LES: How AND WHY CORPORATIONS
GROW AND DIE AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (1988).
13 See Caruana, supra note 2.
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largely because of a particular status quo would be an example of a
counter-technology environment. That does not mean that tech-
nology would not be implemented, but the pace and pattern of
implementation would be unavoidably skewed.
The structure of U.S. public television retards, substantially,
the likelihood that it can take advantage of technological opportu-
nities.14 As in the past with respect to other technologies, PBS and
public broadcasting stations will take steps induced by technologi-
cal opportunities, and that will lead to some systemic improvement,
and perhaps that is all that can be anticipated. But the needs for
change are so great and the opportunities presented so substantial
that, more attention must be paid to bringing vision and possibili-
ties into harmony.
III. TECHNOLOGY, VISION, AND STRUCTURE
Technology, of course, is a key determinant of the moments
and modes of transition. Mter all, public television, as it now exists
in the United States, was, in its infancy, itself a social response to
the availability of the new technology of television.15 Indeed, the
history of public television could be written, in part, as the intersec-
tion of new media technology and government response. Upon
the development of a Table of Allocations-the designation of
spectrum for certain television users or licensees-the federal gov-
ernment reserved a portion (in some ways an orphan-like grab
bag) of frequency opportunities for instructional and educational
purposes. At that point, in the early 1950s, the essence of the reser-
vation was the desire-at some point-to encourage entities which
would adapt the then-new and potent technology of television to a
specialized version of the public weal. 16 The choice of colleges and
universities, for the most part, as recipients of these licenses, estab-
lished and embedded a particular view of how public service televi-
sion in the United States should proceed.!' From the very start,
public policy involved a combination of engineering and organiza-
tional structure; and from the very beginning, this organizational
14 See Richard Somerset-Ward, American Public Television: Programs-Now, and in the Fu-
ture, in PUBUC TELEVISION IN AMERICA 95, 106-11 (Eli M. Noam & Jens Waltermann eds.
1998) [hereinafter PUBUC TELEVISION IN AMERICA]; Willard D. Rowland, Jr., The Institution
of U. S. Public Broadcasting, in PUBLIC TELEVISION IN AMERICA, id., 11, 29-33.
15 See ELLEN CONDLIFFE LAGEMANN, THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CARNEGIE CORPO-
RATION, PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1989).
16 See Howard A. White, Fine Tuning the Federal Government's Role in Public Broadcasting, 46
FED. COMM. LJ. 491, 496-98 (1994).
17 See ROBERT J. BLAKELY, THE PEOPLE'S INSTRUMENT: A PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRAMMING
FOR PUBLIC TELEVISION (1971).
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structure had a substantial impact on the way in which the technol-
ogy could be used. Public service broadcasting would mirror, with
a vengeance, the .localism of its commercial counterpart. I8
Vision or purpose is inextricably tied to structure since all ra-
tional structures begin and end with the question of role and direc-
tion. For the emerging instructional sector, it would be another
ten to fifteen years before the energy of major foundations, linked
with high-level governmental concern, would lead to the Carnegie
Commission report and a purposeful and comprehensive approach
to the use of technology.I9 The resulting system-the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting ("CPB"), the Public Broadcasting Service
("PBS"),. and the ubiquitous local stations-have, since the mid-
1960s, adjusted or sought to adjust to additional new technologies.
These adjustments have included the shift to color television, the
mandate for improved reception of UHF signals, the use of the
vertical blanking interval for closed captioning, the adjustment to
cable television and the use of the satellite as a networking tool.
Now, a complex, more comprehensive, and more overwhelming
set of technologies appear: the Internet, High Definitio.n Televi-
sion ("HDTV"), advanced television services, direct broadcasting
services. Under federal legislation, all commercial and noncom-
mercial stations will get a channel on which to broadcast digital
television ("DTV"), consisting of either one HDTV program (and
some ditacasting) or multiple streams of standard definition pro-
grams and datacasting or other services. As was true in each ear-
lier instance of engineering· opportunity, the question is how the
existing system adapts or alters as a result of a new technology, and
whether the system is organized so as best to use these new
technologies. .
Despite all the love and effort that went into its creation, from
before the days of the first Carnegie Commission and up until the
present day, the public broadcasting sector has been pressed into
conflicting directions in terms of its mission, and this is reflected in
its structure.20 It is true that PBS and its member stations,and
newer players like the American Programming Service, distribute a
rich variety of educational programming to the public and to edu~
cational institutions using several means of distribution. It is true
18 See Rowland, supra note 14, at 15-25; James Ledbetter, Funding and Economics ofAmeri-
can Public Television, in PUBLIC TELEVISION IN AMERICA, supra note 14, 73, 80-92.
19 See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATION TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1967);
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399(b».
20 See TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE, supra note 7.
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that PBS's National Program Service was gloriously a pioneer in
distributing by satellite its programming for broadcast by PBS
member stations, and that it has been in the forefront in sending
signals directly, by direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") services, to ar-
eas unserved by local broadcast stations. The National Program
Service is the jewel in the crown" of PBS. Supplementing these are
such offerings as PBS's Ready to Learn Service, an educational ser-
vice offered in day care centers across the country that helps pre-
pare preschoolers to enter kindergarten.21
A. Structural Obstacles
Yet, despite this overall positive face, there are deep problems,
both horizontally and vertically.22 Horizontally, the confusion has
been whether the system is driven by a social need for education
and instruction-a need fired by the great demands of a huge,
overburdened collection of elementary and high schools through-
out the country-or whether it is an instrument for cultural pro-
gramming, to bring the riches of the metropolis to the entire
nation and to bring the diverse cultures of the American people to
each other. There has been, at times, a division over whether pub-
lic service broadcasting is an instrument primarily for the broad
center and the major cultural institutions that serve it or, in addi-
tion, one specifically designed to redress lacunae by programming
for the cultural needs of underserved groups in society.23 Finally,
in recent years (and reflecting a debate in public service broadcast-
ing systems globally) an additional question has arisen: whether
'competitive entertainment programming ought to be part of a diet
that makes cultural offerings more palatable, thus improving over-
all ratings? Of course, public boradcasting can be all of these: op-
era and symphonies, foreign language programming,
programming that helps the diverse groups in society better un-
derstand their own needs, and programming that informs and en-
riches all by increasing knowledge generally. But including all of
these varied types of programming is costly in terms of resources
and in terms of fashioning strategy.
This horizontal problem· is compounded by the competitive
environment in which public broadcasting finds itself. What was
formerly a niche, which PBS held exclusively, is now chipped away
by competing cable programming services, and this may be far
21 See PBR Notes, PUB. BROADCASTING REp., July 1,1994, available in 1994 WL 11432924.
22 See WILLIAM F. BAKER & GEORGE DESSART, DoWN THE TUBE 242-57 (1998); see also
Ledbetter, supra note 18, at 80-82.
23 See Rowland, supra note 14, at 24-25.
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more the case in a digital future. Cultural channels, however im-
perfect at the moment, dilute an audience for classical music and
adventurous films. Internet providers and competing cable educa-
tional services challenge PBS' dominance in classroom instruction.
And, as PBS changes programming to capture and retain an audi-
ence, it becomes slightly more like the commercial channels from
which it seeks to differentiate itself. Finally, new technologies, mul-
ticast channels resulting from expanded spectrum availability and
digital compression, abundant channels promised by cable and tel-
ephone competitors, and even the Internet, present competition
for that most valuable of commodities-viewer time.
Vertically, the American system is also structurally riven.
There is, most famously, the ancient division over whether the sys-
tem is national, with local nodes, or local, with national coordina-
tion.24 Here the structural flaws have the greatest consequences.
Nationally, there is the complexity created by the existence of both
the CPB and PBS. Within PBS, there are conflicts between the
large and powerful stations and others, over who should control
decisions and how to use new technologies. Quality Time argued
that structural flaws meant that scarce funds that are expended on
maintaining a complex system of local stations and station manage-
ments could be better spent on a national programming service
with greater production and more elaborate marketing.25 Inter-
sector competition intensifies the problems inherent in structure.
A divided PBS, with conflicts between center and stations, must
compete with cable programming services, commercial networks,
and international providers (like the BBC) that are highly inte-
grated. These fault lines have been widening, and with debilitating
consequences, for three decades.
B. Technological Possibilities
New technology becomes an occasion, in most healthy organi-
zations, to rethink opportunities, and the same has been the case
for public broadcasting. Take, for example, the expansion of spec-
trum made available to commercial broadcasters by the 1996 Tele-
communications Act.26 In an October, 1997, ceremony, Vice
President Gore announced the formation of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Public Interest Obligations for Digital TV.27 He discussed
24 See id. at 15-25.
25 See TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE, supra note 7.
26 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 47 U.S.C.).
27 See Remarks by Vice President Al Gore on Presidential Advisory Committee on Public Interest
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the renewed possibility of using technology to benefit public
broadcasters. Speaking of the commercial television system that
controls the bulk of the audience, he said that "[the] tradition of
trusteeship must continue, even as television goes through the
greatest transformation in its history, one that is truly bigger than
the shift from black and white to color-the move from analog to
digital broadcasting."28 But a subtext was that "public interest" ob-
ligations could be satisfied in part by payment to public broadcast-
ers from their commercial counterparts.29 Gore continued:
We also know that digital broadcasting will be more dynamic
and more flexible; more competitive and more interactive-and
potentially much more responsive to the needs and interests of
the American people, if we prepare for it in the right way ....
[T]he fact that [the new technology] is so limitless-the fact
that so many of our present rules and expectations will not ap-
ply-makes digital broadcasting the wild west of the television
age. If we don't map out some of that terrain for public pur-
poses-if we don't carve out meaningful public space on our
newest public airwaves-we could lose the opportunity for
good.30
Here the tones of the past are reiterated: the notion of reserva-
tions, the idea that a portion of spectrum should be set aside and
provided to those who have been the guardians of public broad-
casting in the past. This too, seems to be a hallmark of the existing
U.S. approach. Advanced television service should, and will, be
brought to us by those who brought its analogue predecessors.
Gore employed a theme that suggests the relationship between
technology, structure, and opportunity:
At the same time, the digital spectrum is a valuable asset, one
that will bring an explosion of opportunities for broadcasters.
What we have asked for in return-what we must get in return-
is a significant commitment to the public interest. We all know
what the critical needs are: the need to educate and inform our
children; the need to give parents the tools to protect their chil-
dren from what they consider to be harmful influences; the
need for free and open political debate, driven not by dollars
and soundbites, but by issues and ideas. The challenge we now
face is meeting those needs, protecting our oldest values, in the
Obligations for Digital TV (visited Oct. 22, 1997) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/
whit...arks-on-digital-tv-eommission-text>.
28 [d.
29 See id.
30 [d.
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face of new and changing technology ....31
This statement involves a special opportunity-related to
structure-in American broadcasting. The question, embedded in
Gore's political rhetoric, is whether commercial broadcasters, pro-
vided with extremely valuable spectrum, can be required to dis-
gorge some of the benefits which they will gain, and (this being the
part relating to the structure of public broadcasting) whether this
dividend-if it comes to pass-will be assigned to, or seized by, the
public television system. The issue is not only the internal capacity
of public television to develop a strategy, but also the relationship
of structure to politics, and the capacity of PBS and the lobbying
arm of the local stations to make their power felt.
In terms of vision or official understanding of purpose, the
FCC, in its Fifth Report on Advanced Television Services, 'discussed
in the following way the role that public broadcasting plays and the
regulatory steps necessary, in a time of new technology, to allow it
to expand its role:
, [W]e note our commitment to noncommercial educational tele-
vision service and our recognition of the high quality program-
ming service noncommercial stations have provided to
American viewe'rs over the years. We also acknowledge the finan-
cial difficulties faced by noncommercial stations and reiterate
our view that noncommercial stations will need and warrant spe-
cial relief measures to assist them in the transition to DTV. Ac-
cordingly, we intend to grant such special treatment to
noncommercial broadcasters to afford them every opportunity
to participate in the transition to digital television, and we will
deal with them in a lenient manner. ... [W]e wish to note that
public broadcasting service was the first to establish a digital sat-
ellite transmission system and that public broadcasting licensees
are in the forefront of experimenting with digital television.32
The indications are that public television will be in the fore-
front in terms of using additional capacity to experiment with
HDTV, perhaps being more experimental and more in advance
than the commercial stations. But this could mean that public
broadcasting will be the undercompensated stalking horse for com-
31 Id, For the final report, see ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGA-
TIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE:
FINAL REpORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS (1998) (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.benton.org/PIAC/
report.htm\>.
32 Federal Communication Commission's Fifth Report on Advanced Television Sys-
tems, 62 Fed. Reg. 26,966, 26981-26982 (1997) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73),
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mercial television. Public television could provide; through HDTV,
an inducement for the purchase of advanced sets, at a time when it
is not economic to do so for the commercial stations, but not re-
ceive any substantial benefit for'its pioneering role.
C. Redefinition of Functions
One anticipation is that technology will aid in resolving the
problem of what PBS is, what functions it best serves. To be sure,
some redefinition will occur. Technology requires it because of
the way adaptation to technology means taking structures apart
and putting them back again. But technology does not obviate
choice. The new technology has the appearance of abundance,
but it will certainly be the case that public television cannot do all
things or perform best by trying to continue to intensify all of its
prior goals. Indeed, it is because, dreams aside, not everything can
be done, that it is necessary to look at the variety of possible defini-
tions for public television, and then make choices. Arn~ng these
definitions are the following:
Lifeline. Under this definition, public service television takes
on the residue of public interest obligations from commercial
broadcasting, whatever they are. Under some proposals, and
under the Children's Television Act of 199033 can serve as a model,
commercial broadcasters, in the new technoiogy future, could shed
public interest responsibilities if they were willing to pay noncom-
mercial broadcasters to assume them in their stead.
National Treasure, National Identity. This definition is a re-
minder of the BBC and European public television in its origins, in
which the institution is, in terms of a cultural role, overarching,
like the monarchy, a secular version of the Church of England,
bearer and reflector of identity and charged with a conscious stra-
tegic role in changing culture. This social role is, more than merely
the attainment of viewers, enough. to justify a license fee. This
model is rarely the one that is used to express public television in
the United States, and public broadcasting has not evolved a suffi-
cient audience share to perform this role.
Minority Satisfaction or Empowerment model. The best example of
this, outside Channel 4 in the United Kingdom, is SBS in Australia.
In Australia, the network is dedicated to Vietnamese, Indian, and
other minority culture films and similar, conscious counter-pro-
gramming M'ith the intent that diverse groups deem themselves
33 Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 104 Stat. 996 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 303(a)-(b), 394) (1990».
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more meaningfully included in the Australian whole. The U.S.
public broadcasting service performs this function to some extent,
but when it does it in too notorious a way, it becomes charged with
ignoring its mainstream acculturating or reinforcing responsibility.
Public Sphere. Another way of looking at purpose is to say that
the public service broadcasting is an instrument of civil society,
part of the creation of a public sphere. It increasingly takes on this
function as the commercial entities in American television aban-
don that role more and more. Perhaps it will have a ceded monop-
oly on certain public events-like political conventions and
presidential, regional, and local television debates.
The Collection of Activities Called Public Broadcasting. A reason-
able alternative is not to wax philosophical, but to recognize that
there is an existing structure with existing practices and existing
institutional neuroses and goals. What that existing structure is,
and how it marginally extends itself, is what constitutes public
broadcasting in the United States.
IV. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO STRUCTURE
The principal new technology, the technology that is forcing
decisions, involves providing additional spectrum for advanced tel-
evision services. This technology alone is causing important plan-
ning shifts within PBS. Other new technologies and PBS' attitude
towards them include the Internet and the new modes for global
distribution of television signals. The approach to new technolo-
gies and the steps being taken, or under consideration, are evalu-
ated in terms of the existing problems of structure. PBS and local
stations are doing much to adjust to new technologies, in terms of
using online services, developing revenue streams from the sale of
videocassettes, aggressively entering the world of HDTV, and plan-
ning multiple channels made possible through digitalization and
compression of signals. These wholly laudable emblems of an em-
boldened PBS must be put in context.
A. New Technology as a Solution
New technology can be perceived-and this is sometimes a
great danger-as a providential way out of an entity's historic con-
ceptual difficulties. This is a particular danger for PBS. New tech-
nologies are thought to be a way of solving old horizontal and
vertical problems. Take the horizontal problems discussed above.
Digitalization and compression mean that newly available spectrum
can be used for multicasting. Because of newly abundant capacity,
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it is thought, the system can transcend its functional ambivalences
by encompassing everything. It can be both a great cultural broad-
caster and a targeted provider of educational and instructional pro-
gramming. It can be a channel for the mainstream and for the
edges. It can be politically centrist and politically daring. That is
the dream. Technology relieves scarcity, and scarcity, not the com-
plexity of defining purpose, can be deemed the source for prior
dilemmas.
A similar approach is possible with respect to the "vertical"
problems. Because of the technology of national direct broadcast-
ing, the tortured structural past can have a happy "both/and" solu-
tion as well. Here, technology forces, or is thought to force, a
solution, though it is technology linked, as always, with legislation
or regulation. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act") requires direct broad-
cast services to set aside four to seven percent of their capacity for
programming, akin to that of public television.34 If PBS and the
local stations want to gain this opportunity, they have to fashion a
national feed that is unmediated by local and regional outlets, and
it appears that this will occur.
Both of these hopes-solutions to the vertical and horizontal
problems, the problems of vision and purpose, and the internal
crippling issues of structure-are not, however, automatically re-
solved by the existence of technology. Both solutions, as this is
their weakness, are linked to funding. This is true especially of the
horizontal questions of niche programming versus comprehensive
appeal. But it is true of the second, as well, since legislative provi-
sions that have structural implications come bound in budget pack-
ages. How funds are obtained, both in amount or in process, will
determine what impact technology has on public television.
B. New Technology and Finance
This is, of course, the well-rehearsed problem of scope of
funding and reliability of funding. Multicasting means a great call
on production. Transition to advanced television services, includ-
ing HDTV, requires new equipment. PBS has just emerged from
conflict in federal funding, and problems in subscriber and under-
writer support.35 The result is that new technology is being in-
voked to resolve this third and encompassing problem of the
34 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535).
35 See Rowland, supra note 14, at 40-59.
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system: the political pull of annual funding as opposed to the rela-
tive comfort of a sustained source of revenue, either through a li-
cense fee or endowment or predetermined annual payment.
Increasingly, new technology is positioned as a lever to solve
this problem. Income streams rising from digital spectrum might
be tapped for public broadcasting or assets might be sold to create
an endowment. The important thing is that, here too, unresolved
issues, deeply and historically divisive, can be overcome by the arri-
val of expanded technical capabilities. Thus, the most important
part of a tentative, sketchy but powerful suggestion of Vice-Presi-
dent Gore is that funds from commerc~albroadcasters, possibly re-
lieved of other public interest obligations, might be made available
for public service broadcasters. This is also a direction urged by
Representative Billy Tauzin, chair of the Congressional committee
most 'concerned with these issues.36
C. New Technology and Instruction
Before these structural issues are discussed further, it is useful
to indicate how new technologies could be used conventionally to
assist in the performance of the system's function. Public broad-
casting is, of course, the nation's primary source of classroom pro-
gramming, reaching thirty million students in kindergarten
through tweIth grade, and two million teachers in 70,000 schools.37
It claims to be the world's leader in college telecourses because
over 2.6 million adults have earned college credit through the PBS
Adult Learning Service.38 PBS claims a distance -learning program
in which several technologies are used: broadcast, cable, satellite
and videocassette and disc, and through the PBS ONLINE Web-
site.39 PBS is proud of its history of being the first, in the United
States, to use technology to develop closed captioning for the hear-
ing impaired, descriptive video services for the visually impaired,
and stereo television services; and to transmit television program-
ming by satellite.40 As indicated above, technology, particularly the
technology of multicasting, is to be used to increase greatly the ser-
36 See Tauzin Says New Commission Could Help Create Public Broadcasting Trust Fund, PUB.
BROADCASTING REp., Aug. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8586029.
37 See CPB Backs Demonstration Projects in Distance Learning Report to Congress PUB. BROAD-
CASTING REp., March 12, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2879615.
38 See Marilyn K Melia, Go the Distance Getting a Degree Without Setting Foot on Campus,
CHI. TRlB., Sept. 28, 1998, at 1.
39 See Commercial Without Commercials: Duggan Reinvents PBS with a Goal ofSelf Sufficiency
for the Service, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11792674.
40 See Ann Hodges, PBS Sees Grounds for Hope in Fight over Federal Funds, Hous. CHRON.,
July 29, 1995, at 8.
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vice's commitment to instruction and education. The president of
PBS, Ervin Duggan, has promised that a return to education and
instruction seems a clearly important part of a multicasting future,
as well as a politically acceptable use of some significant aspect of
the abundance made possible through new technologyY
D. New Technology and National Signal Distribution
A key element of the "both/and" solution is the enhancement
of a PBS-controlled national broadcasting service. A direct to
home service that would bypass intermediate stations seems to be a
significant symbolic part of such a solution. Mter its fall 1997 an-
nual meeting, PBS announced it would provide a direct feed to
DBS operators for transmission to all DBS subscribers, not only
those unserved by a local PBS signal.42 This was a major step by
PBS since the signal would be national in origin and distribution.
Furthermore, the announcement was significant in indicating
some progress in terms of internal structure. The membership,
composed of local stations, voted to proceed with this approach
despite reluctance, and in contrast to blocking efforts by stations in
previous years. 43 The possibility of such a national signal meant
that PBS simultaneously sought a Congressional amendment to the
Satellite Home Viewer Act of 198844 to facilitate the automatic
clearance of copyright restrictions to be delivered through a na-
tional signal.
E. New Technology and the Cultural Function
One ofthe most significant challenges to PBS is how to main-
tain its franchise as cultural consciousness, or at least the television
custodian of that consciousness. Ever since CBS sought-unsuc-
cessfully and too early-to develop a high. cultural alternative to
PBS, this aspect of the programming strategy has been at risk.
Now, with planned pay channels like Horizon, with the History
Channel and Arts & Entertainment ("A&E"), and with Bravo on
the arts cinema front, the unrealized threat of CBS may be pardy
accomplished.45 It is possible that competition has increased the
viewership of such programming, but not significandy, especially
41 See generally Duggan hits Commercial Stations' Ambivalence on DTV, PUB. BROADCASTING
REp., April 9, 1999, available in 1997 WL 14869563.
42 PBS Launching Multiple DBS Feeds by Year-End, PUB. BROADCASTING REp., October 31,
1997, available in 1997 WL 14869563.
43 See id.
44 Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. II, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988).
45 See Somerset-Ward, supra note 14, at 104 (citing Robert Ottenhoff, Chief Operating
Officer, PBS, in Television Industry Scan (Feb. 1, 1997» (an internal PBS document at 12).
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given data that viewership in general has remained static despite
the jump in the number of choices.
PBS is trying to address this in part through multicasting and
the new technology.46 It would repackage its cultural program-
ming, possibly seeking to do more to differentiate itself from the
competition.47 Under its announced plan for a digital future, PBS
would show many of the network's prime time shows, such as Nova,
Great Performances, and Masterpiece Theater, in wide screen and high
definition with accompanying six-channel enhanced digital
sound.48 During other day-parts, PBS stations would divide their
digital channel, splitting it into four channels, offering, as an exam-
ple, children's programming on one channel, an adult-education
show on another, a nature show on a third, and elementary-school
course work on the fourth. Using the multichannel option, PBS
stations would have the ability to offer children's programming
and adult cultural programming simultaneously.49
In a digital multi-channel future, PBS is considering that view-
ers might first negotiate a menu screen with small windows-one
for each available channel-so they could then select which to
watch. In addition, the expanded technology would mean that a
portion of the spectrum would be used to send data to viewers,
such as teacher guides for teachers.50
F. Technology and Facilities
Already, small steps are being taken toward the digital and
multicasting future. In October, 1997, the Public Broadcasting
Service dedicated its new all-digital technical operations center.51
It had been the decision of Ervin Duggan, president of PBS, to
demonstrate the Service's dedication to technology by being on
the "bleeding edge" of transition to digital broadcasting.52 PBS
had begun digital transmissions on a limited basis in 1994, provid-
ing dual analog and digital feed for months, and switched to all-
digital path to air in the fall of 1996. At the ceremony establishing
the center, Duggan and other PBS officials said that the switch to
46 Stations Ready to Spend for D7Y; but Study Says Investment Will Fail to RJ!vm;e Vicwm; to
Cable, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11792958.
47 See generally PBS' Ottenhoff Wants PBS in Every Medium, PUB. BROADCASTING REp., June
5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10720836.
48 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of
the House Commerce Comm., 105th Congo (April 23, 1998) (statement of Ervin S. Duggan,
President & C.E.O., Public Broadcasting Service), available in 1998 WL 11517109.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See PBS Goes Digita~ lVDIGEST, Oct. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7065496.
52 See id.
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digital "positions [PBS] for the next step" to HDTV and that it
helped PBS "double or triple the number of our feeds, [the signals
provided to local stations] probably at lower cost than 5 years
ago."53 The early switch was consistent with PBS's history "of get-
ting there first" and "our desire to be on the cutting edge."54 Dug-
gan said PBS was able to add new technology quicker than
commercial broadcasters because "we are not so driven by com-
mercial imperatives" and because manufacturers were willing to
provide discounts to get their equipment placed in a high-profile
public service operation.55
V. FEDERAL POLICY
A. New Technology and Funding
As mentioned, given the existing structure (and even without
it), a vital element of any solution is more reliable, less politicized
federal funding. Without such funding, technology alternatives do
not provide the possibility of break-through solutions. The tech-
nology of abundance without a strategy to program for it, without
annual politically sensitive funding efforts, is but a chimera. Repre-
sentative Tauzin has been advancing a plan, announced in Septem-
ber, 1997, in which commercial broadcasters might establish a
fund or provide annual payments for public television uses in ex-
change for burden-free licenses to develop high-definition televi-
sion.56 This solution, often bruited about in the past, would
provide a benefit even over license fee models. The plan has many
advocates, but it is so ambitious, and it so removes from Congress
the blood sport of punching at PBS annually, that its chances for
success are only fair.
Under the plan, the argument could be made-and has been
by Representative Tauzin-that "taxpayers would no longer have to
help pay their [public television's] bills."57 The Congressman has
also stated plans to form a commission-paralleling one estab-
lished by the White House-that would study other new ways to
fund public broadcasting.58 Under the plan, commercial broad-
casters would have the option to subsidize public television rather
than air required children's programming or offer free political air
53 ld.
54 /d.
55 ld.
56 See Doug Abrahms, Case Made for Using HDTV to Fund PBS, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1997, at All.
57 ld.
58 See id.
HeinOnline -- 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  434 1999
434 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 17:417
time, mirroring options included in the 1990 children's television
legislation.59
A forerunner of the Tauzin proposal, sponsored by former
Senator Larry Pressler, sought in 1995 to establish a trust endow-
ment for public broadcasting that would have been funded in part
by auctioning off HDTV airwaves.6o The bill died after Congress
decided to give broadcasters the HDTV spectrum for free. 61
B. New Technology and Flexibility of Use
For public broadcasting-as for its commercial counterpart-
one of the most pressing immediate strategic questions is how the
new spectrum resource will be used. While HDTV was the promise
that induced much Congressional interest in providing spectrum
to existing broadcasters, incumbents, both public and private, want
flexibility so that they can maximize the benefit of what is
obtained. .
The FCC has, however, begun to constrain, slightly, those
, available alternatives. In the Fourth Further Notice/Third Inquiry
on Advanced Television Services, the FCC outlined its policy both
for noncommercial' and commercial television.62 They included:
(1) preserving a free, universal broadcasting service; (2) fostering
an expeditious and orderly transition to digital technology that will
allow the public to receive the benefits of DTV while taking ac-
count of consumer investment in NTSC television sets; (3) manag-
ing the spectrum to permit the recovery of contiguous blocks of
spectrum, so as to promote spectrum efficiency and to allow the
public the full benefit of its spectrum; and (4) ensuring that the
spectrum-both Advanced TV ("ATV") channels and recovered
channels-will be used in a manner that best serves the public in-
terest. 63 Put more simply, the FCC has as a primary goal the pro-
motion and preservation of a free, universally available, local
broadcast television in a digital world. Just as it used the "must-
59 See Id.
60 See id.
61 In early October; 1997, CPBfOlwarded an implementation proposal to the White
House which underscored the importance of a financing plan. At issue was the question of
how much it would cost public television stations to make the transition to advance serv-
ices, digitalization, and HDTV. CPB requested $771 million in federal funds-over and
above the usual operating budget-to help pay for the change. This $771 million, and $1
billion more that would be raised by local stations, would be in addition to the endowment
for operations that would be the subject of the Tauzin fund.
62 See Federal Communications Commission's Fourth Notice of Proposed Rule Making
and Third Notice of Inquiry on Advanced Television Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,130, 42,131
(1995) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
63 See id.
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carry" rule to strengthen broadcasting at a time of severe competi-
tion from cable, it now seeks to ensure a smooth transition by pro-
viding existing licensees with additional spectrum and imposing
certain simulcasting requirements. Simultaneously, by setting lim-
its for the transition, or providing,. in other ways, some idea of tran-
sition, the FCC was seeking "to promote spectrum efficiency and
rapid recovery of spectrum."64
C. Ancillary Use
Public broadcasters might have taken the position-consistent
with FCC-that all new spectrum they obtained would be used for
educational, cultural, and informational uses and that such uses
would be free to viewers. Instead, the primary associations of pub-
lic broadcasters told the FCC that they favor something that gives
them the opportunity to raise funds from this new spectrum. They
would be free to provide ancillary broadcast and nonbroadcast use
of the DTV channel, supporting the FCC's position that "flexible
use will serve the public interest by helping to spur development of
new technologies and to provide greater opportunities for non-
commercial stations to enhance their public service to their respec-
tive communities."65
Under the public television position, these services could serve
noncommercial and revenue producing purposes. Obviously, "a
noncommercial station could ... utilize digital transmission to dis-
tribute program-related course materials, textbooks, student and
teacher guides, computer software and content areas of the World
Wide Web as part of the station's instructional programming."66
But it would also be' true that "noncommercial stations could use
ancillary and supplementary services, without regard to the educa-
tional content, as a revenue source to support nonprofit services
and operations and the transition to DTV."67 Public stations could
launch a pay service or otherwise use some portion of their new
capacity to raise revenues for the remainder of their efforts. PBS
and the Association· of America's Public Television Stations
("AAPTS"), the licensees lobbying group, also opposed a require-
ment of a minimum time or capacity commitment to HDTV, rather
leaving that determination to the marketplace. AAPTS and PBS, in
joint comments, opposed a minimum HDTV requirement, noting
64 Federal Communication Commission's Fifth Report on Advanced Television Sys-
tems, 62 Fed. Reg. 26,966, 26,967 (1997) (to be codified at 4.7 C.F.R.pt. 73).
MU .
66 111.
67 111.
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that the FCC "can rely on broadcasters and public television's com-
mitment to HDTV."68 They argued that if the Commission adopts
an HDTV requirement, it should be "liberally waived" for non-com-
mercial stations (particularly those analog stations that may share a
DTV channel in the transition).69
VI. STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES TO CHANGE
These responses and adaptations to the availability of spec-
trum for advanced television services are examples of how public
television, like every other institution in American society, is af-
fected profoundly by the existence of new technologies. The cen-
tral idea here, however, is that new technologies are a relatively
small variable in terms of the future of public television in the
United States. Of course, public television will change-and will
have to change. But technological change will not, and certainly
not alone, materially alter the market share or impact our global
status of the American service. It will alter public television no
doubt, but it cannot provide the miraculous cure that seems to be
anticipated as the PBS system looks to new technology to help re-
solve the problem of definition of function, to resolve long-stand-
ing disputes about the national versus local nature of the system
and, as well, to open the door to more secure funding. Let me
examine each of these in turn.
A. Barriers to Structural Change
The remainder of this Essay will focus on what was above
called the second alternative: creating the conditions for change,
adaptation and major shifts in institutional structures to permit
better use of new technologies. In the absence of such change,
there is slow decay and death as PBS program niches get picked
away. Or, there is marketplace adaptation by which PBS becomes
more like another cable programming service with a respectable
narrowcasting share.
To look at structural obstacles to change, we must look at ele-
ments of the status quo and their effect on innovation. For exam-
ple, PBS has obtained, through the must-carry rule, a
Congressional guarantee of shelf space on cable (and, to a much
shakier extent, on DBS), shielding it from certain of the competi-
tive pressures of that new technology.70 While other services, like
68 Id. at 26,972.
69 Id.
70 See Monroe E. Price & Donald W. Hawthorne, Saving Public Television: The Remand of
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Discovery and Bravo, were pressured to determine their role in a
multi-channel environment, public broadcasting could maintain
the status quo. Thus, cable guaranteed it an expanded market, for
a time, rather than merely creating a multichannel environment in
which it would do worse. Even the initiation of C-Span by the cable
industry had its soporific effect on public broadcasting.71 While
this entity can be viewed as a competitor to public broadcasting, it
can also be perceived as an entity that relieved PBS of some public
sphere obligations.
In short, public broadcasting has been protected from market
pressures felt elsewhere that might have forced greater internal
structural changes and led to greater transformation of its pro-
gramming strategy. It has not had to change to keep its cable
channel position and to convince cable operators to carry the sig-
nal. By the same token, the protection of existing broadcast sta-
tions meant that the system did not, at an early stage, build a cable
programming channel, as ABC and NBC did.72
Similarly, in a period of intense jockeying for position in a
global market, the existing clumsy internal organizational struc-
ture, coupled with the history of public broadcasting, has meant
that U.S. public broadcasting will not be a major player, as a na-
tional entity, in transnational services. This does not mean that
local public television stations WNET or WGBH will not make deals
and money. Here the focus is whether there is a market for an
internationalized American public television as an entity. Tech-
nology makes such a market possible, but not for the U.S. system.
The major commercial competitors in the global marketplace are
American, but U.S. public broadcasting has no significant role. It
is the BBC that is trying to stake out a global identity or increase its
global trademark for the Anglophone market.7s
There are several reasons for this: public broadcasting in the
United States was never strong in news, and competition in news
seems to be one of the most important areas for global competi-
tion. The BBC effort, which at first was a mixture of news and en-
tertainment, seems now to be wholly news and information. One
Turner Broadcasting and the Future of Cable Regulation, 17 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 65, 68-
80 (1994).
71 For a history of G-Span, see STEPHEN FRANTZICH & JOHN SULLNAN, THE G-SPAN
REVOLUTION (1996).
72 See Rowland, supra note 14, at 20-25.
73 See Andrew Walker, A SKYFUL OF FREEDOM: 60 YEARS OF THE BBC WORLD SERVICE
(1992); AsA BRIGGS, THE BBC: THE FIRST FIFlYYEARS (1985); see also Lawrie Mifflin, A BBC
Cable Channel is on the Way to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at E1; BBC Seeks Guarantees
from Discovery, CABLE EUROPE, Apr. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11239306.
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can ask, as well, whether the internal and public pressure on PBS,
particularly in news and public affairs, has been toward the local
and, therefore, the parochially domestic, while the BBC has always
had a product which was more transnational or global. Second,
PBS never really developed an international consumer brand name
recognition that could compete with the BBC. The internal organ-
ization of PBS means that it is not nearly so equipped to have an
external strategy ,as is the BBC. Besides, within the great tent of the
BBC, an external voice was always a vital and distinguished part. In
the United States, the Voice of America was always kept away from
public broadcasting. The British way was not necessarily prefera-
ble, but it was far more natural for the BBC to have an interna-
tional agenda-and to know the territory-than it was for PBS,
despite PBS's international marketing and co-production deals.
It is possible, as one model for the future, that there will be a
global public service (or one Anglophone, one Francophone) with
national affiliates. The question is whether there is a global alli-
ance to make this happen and whether the national or local enti-
ties are so public-sphere driven that such a model would be hard to
create. Related is the idea that there could be a kind of global arts
and cultural television production alliance, with a national focus
on public sphere activities. One interesting aspect has been the
development of a strategic arrangement between the BBC and the
Discovery Channel for certain global programming (and domestic
production) rather than extending a more exclusive relationship
with the U.S. public broadcasting system. . ""
These, then, are two big areas where technology affects public
broadcasting: the impact of cable television and DBS in terms of
fashioning the domestic market, and the role of satellites in devel-
oping a global market. PBS' own history provides impediments to
vital change. There is no library to speak of since the independent
producers retain library rights, no effective international alliance,
no dominating history that public broadcasting has a central role
in national idendty building, no tradition of a license, and a creaky
structure which protects itself from innovation by buffering itself
against job loss and extinction.
Some of the changes necessary to alter the capacity of the pub-
lic system to take advantage of new technologies have been imple-
mented, and new technologies have been used to produce these
changes., A New Technologies Working Group ("NTWG") has
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been established and converted to a PBS Board committee.74 PBS
President Duggan told his board that the effort was to ensure that
the NTWG formed under his direction in 1994 would be "more
secure" as it pursued its mission on DBS and other issues, such as
digital TV. 75 It was precisely such governance reforms which
seemed to make technology-positive decisions easier to adopt. For
example, the vote on direct feeds occurred after PBS's first-ever
membership meeting, a result of February, 1997, reforms.76 The
vote arose on the resolution of a coalition of stations urging that
PBS be "position[ed] ... to take advantage of the [DBS] channels
set-aside,"77 referring to the proposed four to seven percent set-
aside for noncommercial educational programming on DBS serv-
ices in the 1992 Cable Act.78
Prior to this vote, and the governance reforms, PBS stations
consistendy voiced concern that a national feed would in fact com-
pete against them.79 They argued that a national feed DBS chan-
nel would have unfair advantages over local stations.80 The
national feed might have a superior picture to that of the local
station. By making DBS more acceptable, by contributing to its ap-
peal to subscribers, PBS would be enhancing a system where
switch-back to terrestrial uses might be hindered and local stations
impaired. As an example of this station-based reluctance, one
member station sought to have the future DBS feed be "distinct"
from National Program Service programming.81 Assurances had to
be given that the feed would be differentiated and, as a conse-
quence, harm to local stations would be minimized. Furthermore,
if there were fundraising on the national feed, the proceeds would
be returned to stations in the donor's zip code.82
At the same time, in a development perhaps linked to issues of
technology, the chair of PBS, Gerald Baliles, publicly stated that
PBS's governance structure needed to be changed "to outfit our-
74 See PBS Board Debates Risk to Stations from DBS National Feed, PUB. BROADCASTING REp.,
April 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8585699.
75 See PBS Seeks to Launch National DBS Feed by Year End, SATELLITE WK., Oct. 27, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 15605724.
76 See PBS Urges Members to Waive Barrier to National DBS Feed, PUB. BROADCASTING REp.,
Sept. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10720907.
77 PBS Launching National DBS Feed by Year-End, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 24, 1997, available in
1997 WL 13780100.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 PBS Launching Multiple DBS Feeds by Year-End, PUB. BROADCASTING REp., Oct. 31, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 14869563.
82 See id.
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selves for that new future."83 He said "we don't have time to
waste,"84 and since the launch of the governance review process last
fall, PBS has heard from "many" within the system who are pro-
change.85 He recognized that those favoring a stronger, more effi-
cient PBS consistently complained that the existing board structure
and complicated decision-making process made it impossible.86
Even those who favored a tighter arrangement had expressed
doubt about whether PBS was the entity that ought to be the car-
rier of renewed leadership.87 Reflecting the ambivalence toward
the issue, Baliles was later quoted as saying to a closed governance
panel that structural change might not be necessary, and sug-
gesting a go-slow approach.88
VII. CHANGING STRUCTURE AND MAxIMIZING BENEFITS FROM
TECHNOLOGY
Looking at all of this from another angle, one can ask what
impact the new technologies have had on existing broadcasting en-
tities and how they have positioned themselves to exploit these op-
portunities. That would provide some suggestion of whether
public television is properly organized (on the assumption that
other, more commercial entities have behaved in a rational man-
ner). New technologies have, of course, facilitated the creation of
a completely different environment world-wide. Quite obviously-
and this became true with cable and satellite, and now with digital
spectrum-the transformation has been from few channels to an
abundance. It has moreover meant a substantial shift from a televi-
sion system that was all free (advertising supported or public) to
one in which payments by the viewer to a distributor (or direct to a
programmer) has become prevalent. From this, a new industry or-
ganization of gatekeepers and distribution patterns has emerged.
New technologies have meant the possibility, and then the inevita-
bility, of cheaper cross-border distribution and, therefore, the pos-
sibility of global markets.89 This, too, has meant redefinitions of
strategies by programmers and by distributors of programming.
And the final new technology, the Internet and World Wide Web,
83 Duggan: PBS Exists to Seroe Stations, Has No Plans for Independence, COMM. DAILY, June
25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2368820.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See ADAM FINN ET AL., GLOBAL TELEVISION AND FILM: AN 1NTRODucnON TO THE Eco-
NOMICS OF THE BUSINESS (1997).
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has altered-and continues to alter-the amount, method, and
form of information coming from broadcaster to consumer.
The creation of a greater number of channels and the funda-
mental change in the distribution systems in the United States has
had a sharply differentiated impact on commercial and noncom-
mercial television in the United States. For much of commercial
broadcasting, this technology-driven fact has led to strategies of
consolidation and vertical integration, neither of which has charac-
terized the public television sector. There is no PBS equivalent of
the Disney acquisition of ABC or of the Time Warner merger with
Turner. The multichannel opportunities of cable have meant that
existing commercial players have developed new products, like
CNBC, MSNBC, ESPN, and A&E. Public television has not devel-
oped similar products during the last twenty years. It has mainly
maintained its niche in a time of economic, political and cultural
assault. This is not a point of chastisement,just description. Given
all the political turmoil that public television has faced, maintain-
ing and slightly improving the status quo is more than could have
been expected.
As to the altered global landscape, because of the never-end-
ing need of the commercial networks to extend and expand mar-
kets, coupled with a library of programs to which they own rights
and the desire to develop brand name recognition, large, relatively
untapped, potentially consumer-oriented markets have been in-
creasingly attractive. Not only NBC, but Rupert Murdoch, Sony,
and others have been willing to take large risks to establish audi-
ences using new satellite technology coupled with new multi-chan-
nel terrestrial distribution systems (or "DTH"). The BBC has been
aggressive as well. Its strategy explicitly has been to become more
secure at home and more competitive worldwide. Public television
has not had the leisure, the resources, or the organization to en-
gage such a dual strategy. In the current political environment, it
had to focus on domestic issues and there was not the Congres-
sional support for investment in PBS to take great overseas risks.
For the BBC (and a few other state-supported public broadcasting
services), government has seen it as in its interest to make invest-
ments that will either help the national policy cause abroad or pay
off and mean less reliance on the domestic license fee.
VIII. A CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED AUCTION
In this environment of great technological opportunity and
dogged structural and political impediments, a number of more
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radical approaches have been suggested. Lawrence Grossman has
proposed a high-powered second public network, utilizing prime
time in a portion of the week, to garner advertising support.90 The
enterprising PBS president, Ervin Duggan, has his own publicly
stated agenda for progress in streamlining within the existing
framework of public television.91
One more aggressive approach is for there to be an auction of
the national service, along. the lines of the British lTV auctions,
where there is a described set of functions to be performed. Bid-
ders offer to perform the required functions or bid up the func-
tions to be performed. Bids would contain-depending on the
nature of the functions described or the proposal of the contend-
ers-either a payment to the government or the guarantee of the
services promised for a contracted government contribution. The
full design of such an auction-too ambitious for this Essay-can
serve as a mental exercise in subjecting public television to care-
fully selected market pressures, not the accidental ones that now
affect program policies adversely.
Public service television-or more likely some part of it-
would be spun off into a private or semi-private corporation, much
like the privatization of airports or highways, or the operation of
prisons or schools. This technique is used as a means of forcing a
definition of purpose and trying to obtain a more efficient way of
accomplishing national goals. The technique is also used as a way
of limiting or defining the government contribution to a public
enterprise. Looking at the evolution of public television globally,
no system has used exactly this approach. On the other'hand, pub-
lic television globally seems to be moving from state control to a
more public-private partnership, or towards entities more capable
of competing in a multi-ehannel and globally defined environ-
ment. In surprising ways, the former evolution of the state broad-
casters in Central and Eastern Europe and in Russia, have
hallmarks of such a redefinition.
To help understand this auction approach, one could ask who
the bidders might be. Looking at counterpart commercial restruc-
turings, candidates might include those who are central to the ex-
isting system or an entity with a library and production capability
90 See Lawrence K. Grossman, Introducing YFV Weekend (visited May 10, 1999) <http://
www.current.org/weekend/wklg597.httnl>. See also DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (Charles Firestone & Amy Korzick Garmer eds., 1998). This document was
highly influential to the Gore Commission ·in terms of setting forth alternatives for the
financing of public television.
91 See Duggan: PBS Exists to Serve Stations, Isn't Planningfar Independence, PUB. BROADCAST-
ING REp., June 28,1996, available in 1996 WL 8312735.
HeinOnline -- 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  443 1999
1999] PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND GOVERNANCE 443
that could use a public distribution system.. An auction would in-
crease the likelihood of vertical or horizontal integration in the
various markets of which public television is a part. It is unclear
who all the bidders might be, but some possibilities include the
Children's Television Workshop or PBS itself, or· a BBC-Discovery
consortium, or an alliance of major PBS local stations, alone or
with the BBC. A commercial network like CBS seeking to redefine
itself, might participate in such an auction, as might Disney-ABC.
It is impossible, in this Essay, to indicate exactly how such an
auction would be structured to render technological opportunities
more productive in terms of the goals of a public service, but some
indication is possible. One idea would be to establish a bidding
process for prime-time public broadcasting-the National Pro-
gramming Service-but leave the remainder to local affiliates. Ex-
tremely important would be whether the bidder would have some
portion of the multicasting opportunities available as a result of
spectrum expansion and digital compression, and under what con-
ditions. For example, the bidder would be committed to providing
an "as is or· better" public broadcast system to nearly 100% of U.S.
households, with some right to do limited advertising on PBS sta-
tions, and some obligation to provide a new public broadcasting
channel on cable-something like the Australian SBS or British
Channel 4 models. The bidder could also bid by providing funds
for the use by affiliates during day parts. The bidder would provide
a plan for the use of digital spectrum and local broadcasting sta-
tions would be required to clear prime time. The bid would be
similar to the British system for the award of Channel 5 licenses
and the award being for a period of years with a new bid at the end
(as opposed to a license renewal process)'. Congress could still par-
ticipate by creating additional program development funds, or by
funding major cultural institutions to produce programming with
the successor organization. .
While a great temptation and likelihood would arise, it would
be highly pragmatic for entities that might seek to enter into such
an auction to help define its terms. This determination should be
done through hearings before the FCC or before a Congressional
subcommittee. An auction or similar transaction might, for exam-
ple, mean that proceeds from a privatized national service, includ-
ing use of digital spectrum during prime time, would finance local
entities with a redefined function as well as production. Federal
budgetary contributions might, in the future, be limited to support
for educational or instructional offerings. One bidder might offer
to provide a service like SBS in Australia which spoke specifically to
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under-served language minorities in the United States. Funds
from an auction could be used to support local production by local
public broadcasting entities during those periods not reserved for
those who prevail at auction. There could be an auction for a na-
tionally-based but decentralized distance learning program (like
Ready to Learn) in which the bidder proposed a model for utiliz-
ing available digital spectrum, reservations on DBS, and over ter-
restrial facilities. Such a bid might be contingent on funding, or
promise some version of partial self-funding through tuition and
other revenue-producing methods. The function of opening up
possibilities-of allowing Microsoft or Disney, or the BBC or Chil-
dren's Television Workshop (or a combination of major PBS sta-
tions) to make a bid-would be to allow a reconceptualization to
occur which did not depend, for its initial validity, on the protec-
tion of existing entities. The British Open University might partici-
pate in a bid for post-secondary instructional broadcasting, in
conjunction with a consortium of American universities or with the
Learning Channel.
The idea, here, is only to sketch the possibilities. It is an un-
derstatement to say that there are enormous, probably insurmount-
able, hurdles. These would include: coordinating a carved out role
with the continuing existence of local station licensees; the consti-
tutional questions involved in actually determining what a public
broadcasting entity should do; the difficult question of who would
judge among bidders and by what criteria. It is only because of
some structural approach that might substantially reenergize-
even more than is now occurring-and strengthen public broad-
casting that such a complex suggestion is put forward.
IX. CONCLUSION
Ervin Duggan is a leader who uses formal opportunities to try
to build consensus or the appearance of consensus. In a June,
1996, speech, Duggan gave an important view of the relationship
between structure and technological development.92 Instead of re-
flecting on fracture and dissent, an earlier theme, Duggan an-
nounced a "year of victory," of "solidarity, unity and cohesion."93
He wished to dispel concerns of local stations that PBS wished to
become independent of them, rather than tied to their continued
maintenance. "Let there be no ambiguity," Duggan exhorted, "we
know why we are here. PBS is here to serve you. We cannot reach
92 See id.
93 [d.
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our audience except through yoU."94 In the speech, Duggan spe-
cifically addressed PBS efforts in the area of new technologies.
Duggan pointed to the PBS World Wide Web site and the forma-
tion of the NTWG originally charged with examining the prospects
of HDTV, ATV, and DBS for programmers and stations.95
Many of these are important steps. They will yield improve-
ments in the workings of the public broadcasting services. They do
so, however, within a structure that remains hobbled. The empha~
sis on structure in this Essay is based on the assumption that ex-
ploitation of technology in the public interest depends on a
complex of political and structural forces. In a world in which
there is intense reorganization so as to maximize the potential
gains from technology shifts, the greatest danger to public televi-
sion could be an inability to react adequately to opportunities pro-
vided. It is in this context that a number of suggestions have been
made for moderate and radical change as precursors for the bene-
fits of engineering advancement. Of course, ex ante, it is difficult to
know what changes in structure will lead to particular social bene-
fits. It may well be that a highly decentralized and almost atom-
ized system can be a greater goal for change than one that is more
structured and controlled from above. The early results from the
commercial sector are mixed. But it is clear that the investments,
the flexibility and the speed necessary for change to take advantage
of new technologies require structural change in public television.
New technologies are, in a sense, like new playing cards dealt in a
high-stakes game. They are opportunities to be sure, but they are
deeply embedded in a pre-existing context and a complex competi-
tive environment. Technologies create opportunities, but policy-
makers, legislators, managers and citizens provide the environment
and structures in which those technologies manifest themselves.
Technological determinism has its place in the discourse of history,
but in the corner of public broadcasting, at this moment in time, it
is implementation, not the technology itself, that is most fateful.
In a time when huge commercial networks have been gobbled
up, have transformed or virtually disintegrated, where relations be-
tween networks and affiliates have been in a state of constant flux,
where the relationships among industry components-broadcast-
ing and cable, for example-have gone from prohibited to inti-
mate, public broadcasting should be subject to radical
reexamination as well. Yet, the entities of public broadcasting are
94 [d.
95 See id.
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holier cows than is their British counterpart. The pressure on the
BBC to transform, to act competitively, and to alter substantially its
structure so as to function in the next several decades, has been
dramatic and effective. For all the clumsy and culture-laden debate
about public broadcasting in the United States, for all the oaths
and cataclysmic predictions ~rom the public broadcasting commu-
nity, or the harsh pledges of budget cuts by conservatives in Con-
gress, there has not been anything like the coherent and effective
refashioning that has taken place in the United Kingdom. To be
sure, the British experience has had its critics. The new leadership
of the BBC is often portrayed as abandoning the Reithian tradition
and playing too facilely to the marketplace, "and there are those
who think that market forces are destroying the institution in order
to save it. What is critical here, however, is that the structure for
change, not for immunity, has been set in motion, and the conse-
quence is that a far more entrepreneurial, far more globally ambi-
tious, and more innovative BBC has emerged.
All this being said, technology and even the structural changes
that will maximize the impact of new technologies, will not tum
America's step-child of public television into a new and glorious
BBC. If anything, the future of the world's public service entities
will become more like the present of its American exemplar. The
history of American public television-and the future of public ser-
vice television around the world-is one of segmentation and nar-
rowcasting, and technology may not change that simple fact. It is
important to examine demography and market share. Oddly, be-
cause PBS always was a sculpted minority, its audience share has
remained more stable than that of many other public service
broadcasters around the world. The problems PBS and America's
public television stations have traditionally faced will increasingly
be found in its more protected equivalents around the world.
